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GRAHAM, Gerald S., The Maritime Struggle for North America. University 
of Toronto Press: 195-0; Issued under the auspices of the Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs. Pp. XIII, 338. 
Gerald S. Graham is Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in the 
University of London, England. A native of Ontario, he is a graduate of 
Queen's University, Kingston, and of Cambridge University, England. 
In 1942 he entered the Canadian armed services and in 1945 he joined the 
Historical section of the Canadian Army. In 1947 he received an appoint-
ment in the University of London, and in 1948 he was promoted to the 
Rhodes Chair at King's College, London. 
2 9 2 REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE L.'AMÉRIQUE FRANÇAISE 
This book Hs concerned chiefly with three centuries of European rivalry 
and expansion". The title of the first chapter is "The Supremacy of Spain", 
while the last chapter describes "The End of the Pax Britannica". In 
between, much of the book is devoted to the struggle between Britain and 
France for North America. Dr. Graham finds throughout that "in the long 
run, statecraft has remained the most potent determinant, and naval 
history, so-called, is essentially political and diplomatic history". 
The author explains why, until the English defeat of the Armada 
(1588), "Spanish sea power resting on Caribbean bases was the determining 
force in the preliminary European conflict for North America". Then the 
basic reason why North America was to become British and not French 
soon emerges. Thanks to the English Channel, British governments showed 
greater constancy than did the French in building fleets. "'The age-old 
rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg... made French sea power a thing of 
intermittant enthusiasms." 
Louis XIV failed to appreciate the importance of superiority at sea. 
His policy of guerre de course "might mean the ravaging of St. John's or 
the sudden capture of Fort York, but it could not prevent... Phips from 
reaching the ramparts of Quebec". While English overseas trade gradually 
expanded, by the end of the reign of Louis XIV, that of France had, "for 
all practical purposes, ceased to exist". 
Yet, "the French continued to build their empire without securing it 
by sea". And French ministers agreed with Montesquieu that "l'effet des 
colonies est d'affaiblir le pays d'où on les tire, sans peupler ceux où on les 
envoie". "It was not, however, until Pitt won control of government, 
that the conquest of Canada became an avowed object of British strategy". 
Then, in 1759, Quebec fell simply because command of the sea meant "the 
ability to bar the enemy's access to his own overseas possessions". 
In the American Revolution, however, the dominating factor in Bri-
tain's failure, says Professor Graham, was political isolation. Unable to 
secure a single European ally, she was outmatched at sea by the combined 
forces of France and Spain. But after 1805, "Napoleon returned to the old 
strategy of guerre de courèe"; and the United States' adventure of 1812 
failed because it never jeopardized British command of the sea. As a result, 
during the "age of iron and steam" which followed, Britain's ships were 
able to carry her manufactures "to every corner of the earth". In 1900 
the British navy was still "predominant in every ocean of the world". 
But by 1913 "it was predominant only in the North Sea". In 1914 and 
1939 "both France and Britain needed the support of North American 
resources". 
The book contains seven maps of parts of Canada and of France, and 
a good index. It conforms throughout to the highest standards of historical 
objectivity. It is of extreme importance, not merely to students of French 
America, but to students of world history. For the unity of western Europe 
and North America has been based on "the indivisibility of a great ocean 
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that has remained constant from the days of the Cabpts to the new era of 
the long-distance bomber". 
Gordon O. ROTHNEY, 
Sir George Williams College^ Montreal. 
